Abstract-Improperly managed private keys and improperly configured endpoints could result in loss of security in traditional way of message exchange .Whereas some mechanisms obtained from the new PC architecture of trusted platforms, such as seal, have exact features to deal with those deficiencies. So adopting the property-based sealing function proposed by some literates and some cryptography schemes, we put forward a trusted transfer model and initiate a secure provably transfer protocol. This protocol not only enhances the data security during transmission, but also ensures data security in storage.
INTRODUCTION
Trusted platform module (TPM) embedded platforms specified by trusted computing group (TCG) extend the conventional PC architecture to obtain some new mechanisms: (i) key management, e.g., all keys managed by TPM have an attribute designation of migratable or non-migratable. This attribute determines whether a key may be transferred from one TPM to another. A non-migratable key was storied inside TPM through its life cycle and would be safer than migratable key.
(ii) configuration management. Trusted platform boot processes are augmented to allow the TPM to measure each of the components in the system and securely store the results of the measurements in Platform Configuration Registers (PCR) within the TPM; (iii) seal. It provides assurance that protected messages are only recoverable when the platform is functioning in a very specific known configuration, e.g., data D can be cryptographically bound to a certain platform configuration C by using the TPM Seal command. Given an asymmetric key pair (SK, PK), we can denote this function abstractly with [ However, there still exacts some deficiencies. Firstly, the semantic of the seal operation is too restrictive to efficiently support sealed information through the software life-cycle including updates / patches. Any change to the measured software components results in changed PCR values, making sealed data inaccessible under the changed platform configuration. Secondly, platform authentication based on configuration essentially is a kind of binary based attestation, which reveals platform's privacy information about the configuration but does not imply that the platform complies with desired (security) properties. Thus property-based attestation and seal operation were proposed in [1] [2] [3] [4] . Propertybased seal [4] binds data to properties instead of hash values of configuration. Property was represented by a random but fixed value, such as virtue configuration C0. Remote parties seal data for a property C0 denote with [D] C0 Seal(C0,PK,D). Given a configuration Ci that actually implements the security properties C0, one obtains a certificate from trusted third party stating the fact: CERT P =(SK TTP ,Ci,C0).Using this certificate, the TPM UpdateSeal_command translate [D] C0 into a sealed blob [D] Ci which can then directly be used.
Though some development has been obtained, little works has been done on trusted transmission at present, so we aim to study the mechanism of trusted transmission adopting property-based seal and initiate a provably secure transfer protocol. Our proposal differs from the classic message exchange based on asymmetric cryptography. It protects message from tampering by sealing with non-migratable key provided by TPM and authenticates endpoint by its security property, instead of encrypting with negotiatory key and authenticating endpoint by its identity. Thus our proposal avoids the loss of security coming from the improper key management and improper endpoints configuration, and enhances the security ultimately.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: Section 2 introduces some basic cryptography knowledge. Section 3 describes the model of transfer protocol. A cryptographic trusted transfer protocol was designed in Section 4. Section 5 analyses the security of protocol and concludes this work.
II. PRELIMINARIES
Pederson commitment [5] ：Let p,q be large prime such that q|p-1, h is a generator of a cyclic subgroup Gq ⊆Zp of prime order q, g is chosen randomly from Gq, furthermore log h g is unknown to the committing party. Let r randomly taken from Zq, A commitment on a message x is computed as C X = g x h r .
Proving the Inequality of Discrete Logarithms [6] : Let G=<g> be a group of prime order q. The prover and verifier have common inputs g, h, y, z∈G, where g and h are generators for G, and log g y≠log h z. The prover has the additional input x=log g y. The prover and verifier then engage in the following protocol:1. The prover chooses r∈ Ｒ Zq, computes the auxiliary commitment C=(h x /z) Y , and sends C to the verifier.2. The prover executes the protocol denoted
verifier accepts log g y≠log h z if it accepts in Step 2, and if C≠1, otherwise the verifier rejects.
III. THE BASIC MODEL OF OUR PROTOCOL
The general idea of our proposal is illustrated in Fig 1. The model involves four parties. Certificate issuer, denoted by TTP, attests that a given platform configuration C fulfills a desired property C0 by means of property certificate CERTp. The root of trust on trusted platform is TPM which has a set of computation and cryptograph capabilities. HOST is the other main component of trusted platform in which a TPM is embedded. The HOST includes software running on trusted platform. TPM can only communicate with other parties via the HOST. SENDER is a party who wants to authenticate the property of platform and sends sealed message. The model works as follows: Firstly, TPM makes commitment to platform configuration C, denote as Ccmit. Next TPM and HOST convince TTP that it makes the commitment truthfully. Then TTP judges platform's property according to its configuration and issuers property certificate to platform, i.e., CERTp=(SKttp,Ccmit,C0). So TPM can execute propertybased seal function using this certificate. Thereafter, before accepting data, HOST and TPM need convince SENDER that platform fulfills exact property without disclosing C. They firstly convince SENDER that C accords with the value committed in certificate. That is they are legal holder of certificate. Secondly they convince SENDER that the certificate is valid and not revoked by TTP. After a successful authentication, SENSDER property seals data with nonmigratable key provided by TPM and sends blob to platform. Adopting Pederson commitment and zero-knowledge proof of inequality of discrete logarithms, we construct an actual protocol which includes certificate application and sealing transmission processes. Two security properties, including unlinkability and unforgeability, were taken into account during protocol design. Unlinkability means that from the proof of certain property and its verification protocol, a SENDER is not able to deduce the specific configuration of a platform, thus the platform's private information was protected. Unforgeability means that a property can only be validated with the involvement of a valid property certificate according with the platform configuration.
A. Certificate application
Three players were involved in this process; include HOST, TPM and TTP. 
B. Property authentication and seal transmission
In this process, SENDER firstly makes sure that the platform owns a property certificate corresponding to its current configuration by testing the unseal function of TPM. Secondly, it needs to confirm that this certificate is not revoked by its issuer. And three players include SENDER, TPM and HOST, involved in this process. [7] , it can be proved that our protocol is secure under the strong RSA and DDH assumption. We omit the attestation process for the length limitation of the paper. And something we need to emphasize is that our protocol enhances security in several aspects. Firstly, it enhances the security of data transmission, for any adversary can not obtain the data through eavesdropping, unless he is powerful enough to break TPM and steal the non-migratable decrypt key, besides he is a legal holder of a valid property certificate. Secondly, because the data accepters satisfy some exact security property and the data is stored in sealed blob, thus the data is protected against unauthorized access. So we assure that the protocol ensures the data security of storage. Finally, property-based platform authentication mechanism protects the platform's configuration privacy and reduces its security risk.
